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THE MIND AND THE HEART IN  
THE CHRISTIAN EAST AND WEST
David Bradshaw
One of the most intriguing features of Eastern Orthodoxy is its understand-
ing of the mind and the heart. Orthodox authors such as St. Gregory Palamas 
speak of “drawing the mind into the heart” through prayer. What does this 
mean, and what does it indicate about the eastern Christian understanding 
of the human person? This essay attempts to answer such questions through 
a comparative study of the eastern and western views of the mind and the 
heart, beginning with their common origin in the Bible and continuing 
through their later divergence.
Pascal famously declared that “the heart has its reasons, which reason 
does not know.”1 This statement gives voice to a sense, widely shared in 
our own time as in Pascal’s, that reason apart from the heart is somehow 
radically incomplete. Yet although such a view has long been a common-
place, most of us would be hard pressed to say precisely what is meant by 
either of the key terms, ‘reason’ or ‘the heart.’ We can begin to get some 
purchase on this question by asking what they meant for Pascal. Like 
many writing in the wake of the Scientific Revolution, Pascal understood 
reason primarily in terms of its opposition to authority and tradition, as a 
faculty for inferring truth that is responsible solely to the deliverances of 
individual sensation and reflection.2 The suggestion made by his famous 
dictum is that, contrary to the enthusiasms of the new philosophy and 
science, the heart has a way of knowing that cannot be understood in 
such terms.
What did Pascal mean by the heart? At times he seems to think of it as 
the faculty of knowing a priori truths, such as that there are three spatial 
dimensions and an infinite series of numbers, as well as that the great 
majority of what we take to be our waking experience is not a dream. 
Like Hume after him, Pascal thinks that our inability to prove such beliefs 
should “serve only to humble reason, which would like to be the judge of 
1Blaise Pascal, Pensées, trans. A. J. Krailsheimer (New York: Penguin, 1966), no. 423 (trans-
lation slightly altered).
2See particularly Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding IV.18.2: reason is “the dis-
covery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or truths which the mind arrives 
at by deduction made from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties; viz. 
by sensation or reflection.”
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everything, but not to confute our certainty.”3 However, Pascal also identi-
fies the heart as the organ of religious faith, and here he seems to have in 
mind less a priori knowledge than an act of immediate perception. He de-
fines faith as “God perceived by the heart, not by the reason,” and he says 
that those who believe without first studying rational arguments “judge 
with their hearts as others judge with their minds.”4 So in general the heart 
for Pascal would seem to be a faculty of immediate, intuitive perception. 
The trouble is that—as Pascal recognizes—this faculty is not infallible, for 
those who “judge with their hearts” sometimes judge wrongly. That raises 
a question which, so far as I can see, Pascal never adequately addresses. 
How can the “reasons” discerned by the heart be properly assessed, with-
out surrendering the independence of the heart as a means of knowing? 
Or to put it another way, how can we give the heart its proper role without 
betraying the imperatives of reason?
Pascal’s understanding of the heart is in some respects idiosyncratic, 
for Pascal does not associate the heart in any particular way with emotion. 
Far more typical is the view of his younger contemporary, the duc de la 
Rouchefoucauld, who in his Maxims presents the heart as the seat of the 
passions. La Rouchefoucauld’s view is that “the head is always the dupe of 
the heart,” a maxim he elaborates through hundreds of biting observations 
about human posturing, self-deception, and vainglory.5 Despite their dif-
ferences, Pascal and La Rouchefoucauld have in common an association of 
the heart with feeling, understood broadly as including both intuition and 
emotion, along with a suspicion that reason is systematically unwilling or 
unable to give such feeling its due. To judge from popular culture, this sus-
picion is still very much with us. The heart is ubiquitous in popular music, 
as it is also in a great deal of literature, poetry, and religious expression. 
Yet philosophers and scientists—whom we may take for present purposes 
as the spokesmen of reason—rarely even mention the heart, save in casual 
metaphors or when speaking strictly of the physical organ.
Of course, to observe that the split between the head and the heart 
which troubled Pascal is a characteristic feature of modern life is hardly 
a new discovery. What has been less widely noted is that within eastern 
Christianity there is also a dichotomy between the head and the heart, but 
one that takes a very different form. Byzantine authors such as St. Gregory 
Palamas (1296–1359) diagnose our current condition as one in which the 
mind has been “dissipated abroad by the senses” and needs to be led back 
into the heart. Far from representing feeling or emotion, the heart is here 
the locus of reason in its proper form, in which alone it is fully responsive 
to divine grace. As Palamas explains:
3Pascal, Pensées, no. 110.
4Ibid., nos. 424 and 382; cf. discussion in Philippe Sellier, Pascal et Saint Augustin (Paris: 
A. Colin, 1970), pp. 128–136.
5See François duc de la Rouchefoucauld, Maxims, trans. Leonard Tancock (New York: 
Penguin, 1959); the quoted maxim is no. 102.
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Our heart is the place of the rational faculty, the first rational organ of the 
body. Consequently, when we seek to keep watch over and correct our rea-
son by a rigorous sobriety, with what are we to keep watch, if we do not 
gather together our mind, which has been dissipated abroad by the senses, 
and lead it back again into the interior, to the selfsame heart which is the seat 
of the thoughts? This is why the justly named Macarius [i.e., “blessed one,” 
a patristic author] immediately goes on to say, “It is there one must look to 
see if grace has inscribed the laws of the Spirit.” Where but in the heart, the 
controlling organ, the throne of grace, where the mind and all the thoughts 
of the soul are to be found?6
There is much here that seems strange from a western standpoint, begin-
ning with the assertion that the heart is “the first rational organ of the 
body.” The very notion of leading the mind back into the heart would make 
little sense for an author such as Pascal or La Rouchefoucauld, for whom 
the division between mind and heart is a fixed feature of our nature rather 
than something potentially subject to transformation. Nonetheless, the 
notion that the mind has been “dissipated abroad by the senses” surely 
has some intuitive appeal, and the idea that grace has inscribed the laws 
of the Spirit on the heart is straightforwardly Biblical (II Cor. 3:3). Further-
more, Palamas does not speak for himself alone, but for a long tradition 
that remains vigorous up to the present day. There is thus good reason 
both to seek to understand his view of the mind and the heart and to take 
it seriously as an alternative to that of our own culture.
My aim in this paper is two-fold. First, I will seek to describe the develop-
ment of these two different ways of understanding the mind and the heart, 
beginning with their origins in Biblical and classical antiquity. As we shall 
see, both originated in the attempt to synthesize Biblical and classical ways 
of thought, although the synthesis took quite different forms in each case. 
Second, I hope that an indirect result of my exposition will be, at least to 
some extent, to commend the eastern view. I believe that this view has two 
important advantages over its western counterpart: first, it is closer to the 
outlook of the Bible, and especially to the Bible’s psychosomatic holism; and 
second, it offers what are, so far as I can judge, legitimate and effective means, 
not only of diagnosing the split between the mind and the heart, but of over-
coming it. Granted that the means are not easy, they nonetheless offer real 
hope in an area where constructive proposals have been notably lacking.
I
First let us review what the mind and the heart signify in the Bible. Of the 
two the heart is probably the more perplexing, so I will take it first.
The Hebrew word generally translated ‘heart’ (lēb and its cognates) oc-
curs over eight hundred times in the Old Testament.7 In its broadest sense it 
6Gregory Palamas, Triads I.2.3; trans. Nicholas Gendle, Gregory Palamas: The Triads (New 
York: Paulist Press, 1983), p. 43.
7For this statement and much of what follows I am indebted to Hans Walter Wolff, Anthro-
pology of the Old Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), pp. 40–58. See also Theological 
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designates the hidden, inaccessible core of something; thus one finds “the 
heart of the sea” to indicate the depths of the sea, and “the heart of heav-
en” to indicate its unattainable heights.8 Far more frequently, of course, it 
indicates the deep and inaccessible core of the human person. Occasion-
ally the reference is straightforwardly physical, as when Joab “took three 
darts in his hand, and thrust them through the heart of Absalom” (II Sam. 
18:14).9 But more often it is to what we would call the psychic, emotional, 
or spiritual core, as when Absalom “stole the hearts of the men of Israel,” 
or David, having put down the rebellion, bowed down their hearts to him-
self (II Sam. 15:6, 19:14). Plainly in the latter sort of case there is no direct 
reference to anything physical, although an echo of the physical remains 
in the association of the heart with something deep, abiding, and decisive, 
rather than superficial or transitory.
There is also a third sort of case, one that falls between these two ex-
tremes. To remain for a moment with the story of David, after David sneaks 
up on Saul and cuts off the fringe of his robe, “David’s heart smote him, 
because he had cut off Saul’s skirt” (I Sam. 24:5). Plainly the heart is here 
an organ of understanding and feeling, but it is also something physical, 
whose guilt and contrition David feels as a physical blow. Again, when 
Abigail returns home after making an elaborate gift to David against the 
wishes of her husband Nabal, “Nabal’s heart was merry within him, for he 
was very drunken: wherefore she told him nothing . . . until the morning 
light. But it came to pass in the morning, when the wine was gone out of 
Nabal, and his wife had told him these things, that his heart died within 
him, and he became as a stone” (I Sam. 25:36–37). Here the heart is first the 
subject of merriment, an emotional state, and then undergoes a straightfor-
wardly physical process, that of dying.10 The author does not seem to feel 
any tension between the two; for him it is the same heart which does both. 
More broadly, a wide range of Biblical idioms seem to indicate primarily an 
emotional or cognitive state or process, but to localize it within the physical 
organ. These include a heart that is hot (Deut. 19:6), a heart that is hard (Ex. 
Dictionary of the New Testament, ed. Gerhard Kittel (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1967), “kar-
dia,” vol. 3, pp. 605–613; Encyclopedia Judaica (New York: Macmillan, 1971), “Heart,” vol. 8, p. 
7; Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament, ed. G. Johannes Botterweck et al. (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1995), “lēb,” vol. 7, pp. 399–437.
8Deut. 4:11, Ps. 46:2, Ezek. 28:8, Jonah 2:3; cf. Wolff, Anthropology, p. 43.
9Biblical quotations are from the King James Version. There is a complication in that Ab-
salom does not actually die until Joab’s henchmen finish him off (v. 15), so that lēb here would 
seem to refer to the breast rather than heart (see particularly the Encyclopedia Judaica article 
cited above). Nonetheless there are other verses where it almost certainly refers to the organ 
we call the heart, as when it is paired with the kidneys (e.g., Ps. 7:9, 26:2, 73:21). More im-
portantly, both the Septuagint and the Vulgate translated lēb by terms (kardia and cor, respec-
tively) whose anatomical reference is solely to the heart. Readers in both the Greek and Latin 
traditions accordingly understood the term in its physical references as having to do solely 
with that organ, and it is in that form that the concept has shaped Christian thought.
10I follow here the traditional interpretation that Nabal suffered a heart attack followed by 
some form of coma or paralysis. (According to the following verse, he died ten days later.) 
For an interesting alternative view, see Marjorie O’Rourke Boyle, “The Law of the Heart: The 
Death of a Fool (I Samuel 25),” Journal of Biblical Literature 120 (2001), pp. 401–427.
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7:3, Josh. 11:20), a “broken heart” (Ps. 34:18, 51:17), a trembling heart (Deut. 
28:65), a heart that is fat (Is. 6:10), “strength of the heart” (Jdg. 19:5, Ps. 
73:26), “pouring forth” the heart (Ps. 62:8, Lam. 2:19), a heart that trembles 
(I Sam. 4:13, 28:5), and a heart that “bubbles up” from within (Ps. 45:1).
The heart, then, is the deepest part of our being, both physically and 
mentally. Because it is deep it is hard to know, and indeed can be known 
fully only by God. Jeremiah exclaims, “the heart is deceitful above all 
things, and desperately wicked: who can know it?” He then answers his 
own question, “I the Lord search the heart, I try the reins, even to give 
every man according to his ways, and according to the fruit of his doings” 
(Jer. 17:9–10).11 The depth and unknowability of the heart mean not only 
that people often are a mystery to one another, but even that they can 
be a mystery to themselves. In the book of Isaiah, God complains of the 
Israelites that they “draw near me with their mouth, and with their lips 
do honor me, but they have removed their heart far from me” (29:13). 
His complaint is not precisely that the Israelites are hypocrites, for it is 
quite likely that they believe that they are serving Him as they ought; it is 
rather that, despite their words and their conscious thoughts, they are far 
removed from Him in the deepest core of what they are. Another striking 
example is when Daniel, in explaining to Nebuchadnezzar the meaning of 
a dream, states that God has revealed it to him (Daniel) “that thou might-
est know the thoughts of thy heart” (Dan. 2:30); in other words, it is Dan-
iel’s role as prophet to unfold to Nebuchadnezzar the content of his own 
heart. Jesus’ lapidary statement, “where your treasure is, there will your 
heart be also” (Matt. 6:21) is, among other things, a warning that one can 
be damnably mistaken about the contents of one’s own heart.
The notion that the heart is deep and hard to know is still a familiar 
one today. In fact we tend to speak of the heart, rather than the mind or 
soul, precisely when we have in mind that which is deeply hidden within. 
However, in so doing we generally have in mind especially the realm of 
“feeling,” as in Pascal and La Rouchefoucauld. In the Bible, by contrast, the 
heart has no particular connection with the emotions, but is also the seat 
of reason, will, and desire. In fact the Bible draws little distinction among 
these different functions. The book of Proverbs commands, “O ye sim-
ple, understand wisdom: and, ye fools, be ye of an understanding heart” 
(8:5). The context makes plain that to be of an “understanding heart” is 
not primarily a matter of mental acuity, but of the possession of rightly 
ordered intentions and desires. The reason that this is seen as a form of 
understanding is that for them to be rightly ordered requires that they be 
formed in light of the knowledge of God, so that knowledge and rightly 
ordered desire go hand in hand. Many other similar passages could be 
cited, such as the prayer of King Solomon, “Give therefore thy servant an 
11See also I Sam. 16:7, I Kings 8:39, II Chron. 6:30. In the New Testament the sense that 
God alone knows the human heart is so strong that it leads to the coinage of a new term, 
kardiognōstēs, “knower of hearts” (Acts 1:24, 15:8).
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understanding [literally: listening] heart to judge thy people, that I may 
discern between good and bad” (I Kings 3:9).12
It is in light of both the depth of the heart, and its holistic integrity, 
that we can understand the supreme importance of a heart that is rightly 
ordered. When in Jeremiah God promises of the Israelites, “I will give 
them an heart to know me” (24:7), He means not primarily that they will 
know about God, but that they will know Him in a direct and personal 
way by obeying His commandments. Thus the heart can have a more or 
less receptive condition, insofar as it is or is not responsive to God. The 
psalmist prays that God will “enlarge my heart” and “incline my heart 
unto thy testimonies” (Ps. 119:32, 36). In Ezekiel the change between these 
two states is put in terms of an actual replacement of the heart: “I will take 
the stony heart out of their flesh, and will give them an heart of flesh: That 
they may walk in my statutes, and keep mine ordinances, and do them: 
and they shall be my people, and I will be their God” (11:19–20).13 A “heart 
of flesh” is not only one that is healthy and functioning properly, but one 
that is readily moved rather than being cold and insensitive. Without such 
a heart any real communion between man and God is impossible.
Let us turn now to the mind, where there are again important differ-
ences between the Biblical and modern understandings. There is no term in 
ancient Hebrew with a semantic range similar to that of ‘mind’ in English, 
although lēb (heart), nepesh (soul), and rūah (spirit) all overlap it to some ex-
tent.14 More immediately relevant for our purposes is the Greek term nous, 
the most common term for mind in the New Testament, and one that is cen-
tral to the later Greek tradition. It bears a range of meanings: mind, reason, 
understanding, thought, judgment, resolve, and disposition.15 The best way 
to get a handle on this variety is to think of its meaning as related in various 
ways to the act of understanding. Specifically, it ranges from: (a) the faculty 
of understanding, to (b) the characteristic way that faculty is exercised, to (c) a 
particular act of its exercise, to (d) the virtue of exercising it well. For example, 
when St. Paul quotes from the Greek translation of Isaiah, “Who has known 
the mind (nous) of the Lord?” (I Cor. 2:16), he would seem to be referring to 
(c), the specific content of the divine mind. When he then goes on to declare 
triumphantly, “But we have the mind of Christ,” he probably refers instead 
to (b), a characteristic way of thinking. He may hint as well that we share 
12Gerhard von Rad offers an interesting comment on this passage: “What he [Solomon], 
the paradigm of the wise man, wished for himself was not the authoritative reason which 
reigns supreme over dead natural matter, the reason of modern consciousness, but an ‘un-
derstanding’ reason, a feeling for the truth which emanates from the world and addresses 
man. He was totally receptive to that truth, but this was not passivity, but an intense activity, 
the object of which was response, prudent articulation. . . . The Solomon of I Kings 3 could—
regarded objectively—have said that he would yield to Yahweh so that the world might not 
remain dumb for him but that it might be understood by him.” Gerhard von Rad, Wisdom in 
Israel (London: SCM Press, 1972), pp. 296–297.
13This promise is substantially repeated at 36:26–27.
14See Wolff, Anthropology of the Old Testament, pp. 10–58.
15See the Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, “nous,” vol. 4, pp. 951–960.
582 Faith and Philosophy
in (a), Christ’s very faculty of understanding, since otherwise to share in his 
way of thinking could be merely a temporary or accidental fact.
For our purposes there are two important points to notice. The first is 
that, because of this range of meanings, nous does not stand in opposition 
to feeling or emotion in the same way as does ‘mind’ in English. Paul often 
attaches to it a moral character, speaking of a “fleshly mind” (Col. 2:18), 
a “corrupt mind” (I Tim. 6:5, II Tim. 3:8), a mind that is defiled (Titus 
1:15), or a mind that has been tested and found unworthy (Rom. 1:28).16 
He does not refer here merely to failings of intellect, but to a habitual 
tendency to think and feel in ways that are self-serving or debased. There 
is also at least one place where nous has a purely positive connotation, 
Romans 7:23, where Paul speaks of “the law of my mind” that opposes 
the law of sin in his members. Here nous would seem to mean the faculty 
of understanding specifically insofar as it is correct and true. This passage 
is particularly noteworthy, for it seems to echo the usage of nous among 
philosophical authors, for whom (as we shall see) nous is a faculty specifi-
cally fitted for communion with God. It thus offers a bridge between the 
Biblical and philosophical meanings of the term, one that would later be 
taken advantage of by the Greek Fathers.
Nonetheless—and this is the second point—in the New Testament the 
predominant emphasis remains that our current, fallen nous is in need of 
transformation. The same text which speaks of “the law of my mind” also 
includes the command, “be not conformed to this world, but be ye trans-
formed by the renewing of your mind (nous)” (Rom. 12:2). The “renewing 
of the mind” is here not so much a new intellectual ability as a practical 
understanding of the will of God that is effective in the sphere of action. 
Elsewhere Paul directs his audience to “be renewed in the spirit of your 
mind (nous), and . . . [to] put on the new man, which after God is created 
in righteousness and true holiness” (Eph. 4:23–24). Here, too, the renewal 
of the mind is a thoroughgoing transformation that brings one into con-
formity with the divine will.
This quick survey already makes it plain that the Biblical contrast be-
tween the heart and the mind is not at all that between feeling and thought. 
It is rather that between the core of what we are and our phenomenal con-
sciousness, composed as it is of thoughts, emotions, feelings, and desires, 
whether habitual or transitory. One final point that needs clarifying is the 
different ways in which the heart and the mind respond to God. Both of 
them can be more or less pure, and both are in need of transformation; yet 
how this is true is different in each case, and the difference is important 
for their later history.
The fact that the heart is a physical organ which we do not see, but 
whose power wells up from within, not only makes it deep and hard to 
know; it also makes it capable of receiving mysteries in a way that the con-
scious mind is not. We have noted, for example, how the Psalmist prays 
16That is the literal meaning of adokimos, translated in the K.J.V. as ‘reprobate.’
THE MIND AND THE HEART IN THE CHRISTIAN EAST AND WEST 583
for a heart that is inclined toward God, and Ezekiel prophesies that the 
Israelites will be given hearts of flesh. Perhaps the most striking instance 
of the heart as an organ of spiritual receptivity is an episode in the book 
of Jeremiah. Jeremiah has been placed in the stocks and publicly ridiculed 
for his prophecies. Since it was his attempt to obey God that brought him 
to this point, he places the blame for what has been done to him square-
ly on God: “O Lord, thou hast deceived me, and I was deceived: thou 
art stronger than I, and hast prevailed: I am in derision daily, every one 
mocketh me” (20:7). He then adds that he had resolved to speak God’s 
word no more, but the word itself would not allow him: “Then I said, I will 
not make mention of him, nor speak any more in his name. But his word 
was in mine heart as a burning fire shut up in my bones, and I was weary 
with forbearing, and I could not stay [i.e., refrain from speaking]” (20:9). 
His word was in mine heart as a burning fire shut up in my bones. The heart is 
here not only a metaphor for the deepest level of his being; it is also the 
physical organ itself, one that Jeremiah’s conscious mind cannot escape or 
overrule, however much he might wish to do so.
The New Testament also gives prominence to the heart as an organ of 
spiritual receptivity. After the birth of Jesus, Mary “kept all these things 
and pondered them in her heart” (Luke 2:19). The word translated ‘pon-
dered’ is sumballousa, “drawing together.” Mary draws all that she has 
seen and heard into her heart, where its meaning will unfold, not so much 
intellectually, as by her continual act of living in light of it. Later in the 
same Gospel, after Jesus appears to his disciples on the road to Emmaus, 
they exclaim to one another, “Did not our heart burn within us, while he 
talked with us by the way?” (24:32). Here too it is the heart that recognizes 
and receives the mysteries that Jesus reveals. The fact that as it does so it 
“burns” indicates that the heart is here still a unity which is at once physi-
cal, emotional, and cognitive.
St. Paul likewise presents the heart as the point of our being that is 
in most immediately open to God. He speaks of God as giving “the ear-
nest of the Spirit in our hearts” (II Cor. 1:22), as having “shined in our 
hearts” (II Cor. 4:6), and as having “sent forth the Spirit of his Son into 
your hearts” (Gal. 4:6), and he describes the Christians in Corinth as an 
epistle “written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God; not in 
tables of stone, but in fleshy tables of the heart” (II Cor. 3:3). Like Luke, he 
understands the heart as capable of receiving and understanding myster-
ies in a way surpassing the mind. Thus he prays for the Ephesians that 
“the eyes of your heart be enlightened, that ye may know what is the hope 
of his [God’s] calling, and what the riches of the glory of his inheritance 
in the saints” (Eph. 1:18), and later he urges them not to be like those who 
are “alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them, 
because of the hardness of their heart” (4:18).17
17I have modified the translation of the first verse, where the K.J.V. renders kardia as “un-
derstanding.”
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In speaking of the heart as an organ of spiritual receptivity, I mean to 
emphasize its physical character. In this it contrasts with the mind, which 
is instead (as in Paul’s teaching about the renewal of the mind) a faculty of 
spiritual receptivity. The difference is that, as an organ, the heart is part 
of our physical make-up, something that we did not choose and cannot 
readily change. Indeed it is so deep within us that we do not fully know 
its contents or understand what it utters. Only God, who “searches the 
heart,” is capable of knowing it fully and reaching into the depths to trans-
form it. The mind, as the level of conscious awareness, is more immedi-
ately subject to our control, but is also subject to self-deception. All of this 
means that if the heart has received the Spirit of God, as prophesied in the 
Old Testament and proclaimed by St. Paul, then if the mind is alienated 
from the heart, it will also be alienated from God.
II
Obviously much has intervened in the two thousand years between St. 
Paul and us to change this understanding. One might think that the deci-
sive event was the discovery by William Harvey that the heart is a pump, 
along with the rise of a mechanistic approach to the body in authors such 
as Descartes and LaMettrie. In fact, however, decisive steps away from a 
Biblical psychology had already been taken long before, and the events 
of the seventeenth century, important though they were, merely crystal-
lized an existing line of development. In brief, the story I shall tell is one in 
which the early Christian Fathers already were rather far from the Biblical 
categories, for they read the Bible through Hellenistic lenses. In the West 
this initial direction was never reversed, although there were a number 
of further twists and turns before arriving at the situation we find today. 
In the East there was a reversal, thanks to the influence of an anonymous 
Syrian monk known as Pseudo-Macarius. The East did not adopt a purely 
Biblical psychology, however, but interwove with it some further ideas 
drawn from Greek philosophy. Thus each tradition has a rather complex 
story. Although it will not be possible here to recount either in detail, I 
shall attempt to point out their important milestones.
First a word about the Hellenistic lenses. There were, broadly speak-
ing, two views of the heart in the classical Greek tradition.18 Plato gives 
it a fairly minimal role. His most important dialogues about the soul, the 
Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Republic, scarcely even mention it. There is more in 
the Timaeus, for there Plato maps the three parts of the soul onto the body, 
with reason being seated in the head, passion in the chest, and appetite 
in the region of the stomach. The role of the heart is to act as the agent of 
passion, which in turn is to be governed by reason, so that when things 
go correctly the heart communicates the dictates of reason throughout the 
18For a more detailed account see Antoine Guillamont, “Les sens des noms du Coeur dans 
l’antiquité,” Le Coeur (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1950), pp. 41–81, especially pp. 51–61; C. R. S. 
Harris, The Heart and the Vascular System in Ancient Greek Medicine, from Alcmaeon to Galen 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).
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entire body (70b). Yet passion can also overheat the heart, and so the gods 
placed next to it the lungs to act as a cooling agent (70c–d). Plato’s iden-
tification of the head as the seat of reason and the heart as the seat of the 
passions was followed by Galen, among others, and so found its way into 
the mainstream of medieval thought.
The other view was that of Aristotle and the Stoics. Aristotle, observing 
that the heart is the first organ to form in embryos, concluded that it directs 
the embryo’s subsequent development. He also regarded it as the “prima-
ry sense organ,” the place where impressions derived from all the senses 
converge and are unified into a coherent picture of the world. Finally, in 
at least some texts he made the heart the seat of the soul itself.19 The Sto-
ics held a similar view, teaching that the heart generates the other bodily 
parts and that it is the seat of the hēgemonikon, the ruling part of the soul.20 
The identification of the heart as the seat of intelligence and of the ruling 
part of the soul was also adopted by the Epicureans and by the pseudo-
Hippocratic treatise On the Heart, written in the third century B.C.21
Thus there were in the classical tradition two views of the heart, one 
associating it primarily with the passions and the other primarily with 
reason (although not to the exclusion of the passions). Importantly, how-
ever, neither view presents the heart as something deep or mysterious, 
nor as a person’s true self, the place of an intimate communion with God. 
To the extent that Greek thought had any place for such notions, it as-
signed them instead to the intellect or soul. It is not surprising that early 
Christian authors, seeking to interpret the Biblical concept of the heart 
in a way that would be intelligible to the Greco-Roman world, did so 
in terms of these categories. Origen, for example, explicitly identifies the 
heart as it is spoken of in Scripture with intellect (nous).22 St. Gregory of 
Nyssa similarly identifies it with soul or intelligence (dianoia).23 That is 
not to say that these authors had no use for the actual Biblical language 
regarding the heart, which they were happy to adopt as metaphor; in 
interpreting the metaphor, however, they found the heart as a physical 
organ to be irrelevant.
19Aristotle’s references to the heart are scattered throughout his scientific works; see The 
Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), pp. 137, 163, 187–188; or in more detail Harris, The Heart and the Vascular System, 
pp. 121–176. The texts locating the soul in the heart appear to be at odds with the De Anima, 
where the soul has no specific location because it is the form of the body.
20See A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), vol. 1, sections 53D, G, and U, with further references in TDNT, vol. 
3, pp. 608–609.
21See Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers X.66; Lucretius, On the Nature of 
Things III.136–142; Hippocratic Writings, ed. G. E. R. Lloyd (New York: Penguin, 1978), p. 351.
22Origen, On First Principles I.1.9, Against Celsus VI.69; cf. Guillaumont, “Les sens,” pp. 
68–69.
23Gregory of Nyssa, On the Song of Songs VII (PG 44 937d), VIII (949C), cited in Guillau-
mont, “Les sens,” pp. 71–72. Note also the sixth of Gregory’s Homilies on the Beatitudes, where 
to be “pure in heart” is to “remove evil from the very choice of the will”; Gregory of Nyssa, 
The Lord’s Prayer, The Beatitudes (New York: Newman Press, 1954), p. 151.
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Broadly speaking, this pattern remained in place among the Latin Fa-
thers. Perhaps no one has explored the poetic force of the Biblical language 
of the heart more powerfully than St. Augustine. The Confessions famously 
opens with the declaration, “Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our hearts 
are restless till they find rest in Thee.”24 Much of the subsequent story is 
told in terms of the turmoil, humiliation, contrition, and exaltation of Au-
gustine’s heart. The heart is the “inner dwelling place” where Augustine 
stirs up tumult against his own soul; it is “what I am inwardly” and the 
place “where I am whatever I am.”25 As the inner self, it is also where God is 
most deeply active and where one’s response to Him must be made. Augus-
tine remarks of his gradual recovery of belief, “little by little, Lord, with a 
gentle and most merciful hand you were working upon and composing my 
heart.”26 Likewise, in the famous rapture at Ostia, Augustine and Monica 
attain their fleeting contact with divine Wisdom by straining “all the effort 
of our heart.”27 Nonetheless, when Augustine wishes to be literal he invari-
ably glosses the meaning of ‘heart’ by a more philosophical term such as 
soul (anima), mind (mens), or will (voluntas).28 His own extensive psycho-
logical investigations, both in his early works and the late On the Trinity, are 
almost exclusively in terms of such categories, with virtually no reference 
to the heart.
A perusal of the long entries for cor in the Thesaurus Linguae Latinae and 
the Mittellateinisches Wőrterbuch reveals that these identifications were not 
unique to Augustine, but formed more or less the common assumption of 
Latin readers of the Bible. Among later theologians it appears that the iden-
tification of the heart with the will was particularly favored. St. Anselm, St. 
Bernard of Clairvaux, and St. Thomas Aquinas all make such an identifi-
cation casually and without argument, in a way which suggests that they 
saw it as a commonplace.29 Like Augustine, although they speak of the 
heart readily, they give it no place within their developed psychology.
The identification of the heart with the soul, mind, or will, however, 
does not yet explain how it came to have the predominant association 
with feeling that we find today. In part this reflects the continuing use of 
the term for the physical organ, which these various philosophical iden-
tifications certainly did not erase. The Platonic and Galenic view of the 
heart as the seat of the passions also played a role. However, the real turn-
24Augustine, Confessions I.1.
25Ibid., VIII.8, X.3; cf. further references in Guillaumont, “Les sens,” pp. 72–74; and Goul-
ven Madec, “Cor” in Augustinus-Lexicon, ed. Cornelius Mayer (Basel: Schwabe, 1986), vol. 2, 
col. 1–6.
26Ibid., VI.5.
27Ibid., IX.10.
28See respectively On the Trinity X.7(9), Sermon 265C, and Unfinished Work against Julian 
II.220. Augustine does not attempt to harmonize these various suggestions; presumably he 
held that some Biblical texts refer to one of the three, and some to others.
29Anselm, On Truth 12, On the Concordance of God’s Foreknowledge, Predestination, and Grace 
with Human Freedom III.2; Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermons on the Song of Songs 42.4.7; Aquinas, 
Summa Theologiae IaIIae Q. 24, art. 3, IIaIIae Q. 44, art. 5; cf. IIaIIae Q. 7, art. 2, obj. 1.
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ing point appears to have occurred in the twelfth century, when western 
Europe saw a new preoccupation with intensity and vividness of feeling, 
both secular (as in the courtly love movement) and religious. Of particular 
importance for the latter was the “affective mysticism” pioneered by St. 
Bernard of Clairvaux. As Andrew Louth has observed, Bernard’s mysti-
cism differs from that of Augustine in the sharp contrast it draws between 
knowledge and love, and its classification of love as an affectio, a feeling.30 
Since love is a feeling, and love for God is of paramount importance, the 
pursuit of feeling for its own sake took on a central role. What this im-
plied for the heart can be seen in a passage from Bernard’s homilies on 
the Song of Songs. Adopting a traditional motif, Bernard sees the wound 
in Christ’s side as opening up a passage to the depths of his heart; more 
than earlier authors, however, he gives what is thus laid open a distinctly 
sentimental cast:
The iron pierced his soul, and his heart has drawn near to us, that no longer 
should he not know how to show compassion on my woes. The secrets of his 
heart lie open to me through the cloven body. . . . Why should not the heart 
lie open through the wounds? For what shines out more surely from Thy 
wounds but the truth that ‘the Lord is sweet and merciful and full of pity’?31
The new kind of emotional intimacy enabled by the passage to Christ’s 
heart is illustrated by the case of a martyr: “The martyr stands fearless and 
in triumph, though his body be torn. While iron pierces his side he watch-
es, not only with strength but with joy, the blood that pours out from his 
flesh. Where then is the soul of the martyr? It is safe; it is on the rock; it is 
in the heart of Jesus, whose wounds were opened to let it in.”32
In the decades following Bernard, the devotion to Christ’s heart took 
on increasingly vivid forms. A number of female saints, beginning with 
a Cistercian nun, St. Lutgarde of Aywières (1182–1246), experienced vi-
sions in which Christ literally removed their heart and replaced it with his 
own.33 Others had other visions of comparable intensity, such as that of St. 
30“For Augustine . . . the soul’s love of God and the soul’s knowledge of God go together: 
the soul wants to know God more and more because it loves him, and loves him because 
it knows that he is supreme Truth and Beauty. Love and knowledge of God are united in 
the kind of knowledge we have of God, namely, wisdom, sapientia. Sapientia, in contrast to 
scientia, ordinary knowledge, is concerned with eternal reality and contemplation of it. . . . 
With Bernard, however, there is a sharp contrast between knowledge and love, for love is not 
primarily a desire for possession and delight in possessing, as with Augustine, but a feeling. 
Amor est affectio naturalis, una de quattor—‘Love is a feeling, one of four’ (the others being fear, 
joy, and sorrow). . . . When he contrasts sapientia and scientia he is not contrasting a higher 
intellectual activity with a lower, but a feeling which delights in the good and finds it sweet, 
with an intellectual activity.” Andrew Louth, “Bernard and Affective Mysticism” in The Influ-
ence of Saint Bernard, ed. Benedicta Ward (Oxford: SLG Press, 1976), pp. 2–10, at p. 3.
31Bernard of Clairvaux, Homilies on the Song of Songs 61 (PL 184 1070), translated in Mar-
garet Williams, The Sacred Heart in the Life of the Church (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1957), 
p. 34 (translation adapted).
32Ibid., Williams, The Sacred Heart, p. 35.
33See Williams, The Sacred Heart, pp. 47–50, 59, 115–116; Andre Cabassut, “Changement 
des Coeurs,” Dictionnaire de Spiritualité (Paris: Beauchesne, 1953), vol. 2, col. 1046–1051.
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Gertrude of Helfta (1256–1302), who saw “a stream of honey coming forth 
from the heart of Jesus, and distilling itself into hers.”34 I will not discuss 
these visions in detail, but it is likely that such stories, and the growing 
devotion to the Sacred Heart which they exemplify, did much to fix in 
the popular mind the association of the heart with feeling. When the dis-
covery that the heart is a pump was made in the seventeenth century, the 
stage was set for the bifurcation between the objective and scientific heart, 
which is nothing more than a physical organ, and the heart of popular 
imagination, which is the seat of sentiment, emotion, and intuition.
III
Now let us turn to the Christian East. Undoubtedly the two most impor-
tant sources for the eastern view of the mind and heart were two authors 
of the late fourth century, Pseudo-Macarius and Evagrius.
Pseudo-Macarius was an anonymous Syrian monk whose homilies cir-
culated in antiquity under the name of St. Macarius the Egyptian, one of 
the Desert Fathers.35 Since they are still known as the Macarian Homilies, 
I shall refer to him as “Macarius” for short. Macarius has a vivid Biblical 
sense of the heart as the center of the human person and the place where 
divine grace is imparted. Alluding to II Corinthians 3, he writes:
Divine grace writes on the ‘tables of the heart’ the laws of the Spirit and 
the heavenly mysteries. For the heart directs all the organs of the body, and 
when grace gains possession of the heart, it rules over all the members [of 
the body] and the thoughts. For there, in the heart, the mind (nous) abides 
as well as all the thoughts of the soul and all its hopes. This is how grace 
penetrates throughout all parts of the body.36
Macarius adopts here the Aristotelian-Stoic view of the heart as the seat 
of the soul and organ of thought. He reasons that, since the heart is the 
ruling organ of the body, it communicates to the entire body the grace 
that it receives. Of course this is true only insofar as grace is present, for 
Macarius is well aware that the heart is capable of evil as well as good. For 
the heart to be governed by grace depends on both our own effort and the 
free gift of God. Macarius illustrates by likening the heart to a garden: just 
as a gardener must work hard while at the same time looking to heaven 
for rain, we too must “work the soil of the heart by free deliberation and 
hard work,” while recognizing that without grace our labors can bring 
34Life and Revelations of Saint Gertrude (London: Burns, 1870), 414, cited in Williams, The Sa-
cred Heart, p. 51. Another closely related development was that of the literary motif in which 
one person eats the heart of another, sometimes as punishment for adultery, and sometimes 
intentionally as an indication of deep emotional exchange; Dante, for example, reports in La 
Vita Nuova a vision wherein a figure whom Dante identifies as Love compels Beatrice to eat 
Dante’s flaming heart. See Milad Doueihi, A Perverse History of the Human Heart (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 19–62.
35See the Introduction to Pseudo-Macarius: The Fifty Spiritual Homilies and the Great Letter, 
ed. and trans. George Maloney (New York: Paulist Press, 1992).
36Homilies 15.20; tr. Maloney, p. 116, modified. For the Greek text see Die 50 Geistlichen Hom-
ilien Des Makarios, ed. H. Dörries, E. Klostermann, and M. Kroeger (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1964).
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nothing.37 Later he again uses the metaphor of a garden, but this time with 
an emphasis on vigilance against evil thoughts. The heart, he says, is like 
an enclosed garden outside of which is a fast-moving river. If the river eats 
away the foundations of the wall, the wall will be destroyed and the gar-
den flooded. “So it is also with man’s heart. It has good thoughts, but the 
rivers of evil are always flowing near the heart, seeking to bring it down 
and draw it to its own side. If the mind should be turned ever so little 
toward frivolity and yield to unclean thoughts, look out—the spirits of er-
ror have roamed the pastureland and have entered and have overturned 
there the beautiful things.”38 We note here that the mind’s natural home 
is within the heart, but it can also be drawn astray and dissipated by evil 
thoughts, thereby overthrowing the heart’s natural integrity.
Evagrius is not as directly Biblical as Macarius. Although he was a 
friend of St. Basil the Great and St. Gregory Nazianzen, the greatest influ-
ence on his thought was Origen. Like Origen, he thinks of our embodied 
condition as a fall from an earlier state of unity with God, and accordingly 
he gives the body little positive role in prayer. Prayer is “communion of 
the intellect (nous) with God.”39 To attain it one must first seek dispassion 
(apatheia) through traditional monastic and ascetic practices, regarding 
which Evagrius offers a great deal of practical direction. Even so, “one 
who has attained dispassion has not necessarily achieved pure prayer. For 
he may still be occupied with thoughts which, although dispassionate, 
distract him and keep him far from God.”40 Hence one must also seek the 
aid of God, “who gives prayer to him who prays.”41 Evagrius explains:
While all else produces thoughts, ideas and speculations in the intellect 
through changes in the body, the Lord does the opposite: by entering the 
intellect, He fills it with whatever knowledge He wishes; and through the 
intellect He calms the uncontrolled impulses of the body.42
Thus, although Evagrius sometimes speaks of pure prayer as a movement 
beyond all thoughts (noēmata), what he actually seems to have in mind is 
a state in which the intellect possesses only thoughts imparted directly 
by God. Nous when it is thus in direct communion with God becomes the 
“place of God” and the “throne of God.” It is occupied by no specific form 
or image, but has a direct awareness (aisthēsis) of God, accompanied by a 
passionate desire (erōs) for Him.43
37Homilies 26.10; tr. Maloney, p. 167.
38Homilies 43.6; tr. Maloney, p. 221, slightly modified.
39Evagrius, On Prayer 3; translation in The Philokalia, trans. G. E. H. Palmer, Philip Sher-
rard, and Kallistos Ware (London: Faber and Faber, 1979 – ), vol. 1, p. 57. For the Greek text 
see PG 79, 1165–1199 (where, however, the numbering of chapters is slightly different).
40Ibid., 56; tr. Philokalia, vol. 1, p. 62.
41I Samuel 2:9 LXX, cited in On Prayer 59. 
42Evagrius, On Prayer 64; tr. Philokalia, vol. 1, p. 63.
43See the texts cited and discussed in Columba Stewart, “Imageless Prayer and the Theo-
logical Vision of Evagrius Ponticus,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 9 (2001), pp. 173–204, 
especially pp. 189–201.
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It is plain that the role Evagrius assigns to nous goes well beyond any-
thing in the New Testament. Its lineage is philosophical, with roots in texts 
such as the Divided Line passage of the Republic, where nous is the fac-
ulty that apprehends the Forms, and the Charioteer myth in the Phaedrus, 
where the charioteer of the soul (who leads the soul toward intelligible 
reality) is nous.44 Likewise in Aristotle, one thinks of the special role as-
signed to nous in apprehending first principles, as well as the observa-
tion in the Nicomachean Ethics that a person’s nous is his true self, and the 
identification in Metaphysics Lambda of nous with God.45 For both authors, 
nous is both a person’s true self and the element within the person that has 
the greatest innate affinity to God. Although this is not the predominant 
Biblical meaning of the term (apart from Romans 7:23), nonetheless it was 
embraced by many of the Greek Fathers, including the Greek Apologists, 
Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Athanasius, and Gregory Nazianzen.46 Of 
course a Christian also has to be mindful of the Pauline teaching regarding 
the fallenness of the nous and the need to be “transformed by the renewing 
of your mind.” Hence these authors frequently add that it is only when 
the nous is purified and restored to its natural condition that it can appre-
hend God. Evagrius is solidly within this tradition in teaching that prayer 
is an act of the nous, but that pure prayer requires the nous to be purified 
of the passions and inspired by the Holy Spirit.
Macarius and Evagrius together bequeathed a rich legacy to the later 
tradition. It was not long before their ideas were synthesized into a com-
prehensive view incorporating both the heart and the intellect. (I shall use 
‘intellect’ to translate nous in the sense given it by Evagrius.) The primary 
author of this synthesis was St. Diadochus of Photike, a bishop who wrote 
around the mid-fifth century.47 Diadochus’s teaching can be approached 
most readily through his understanding of the consequences of the Fall. 
According to Diadochus, the Fall divided the perceptive faculty originally 
planted within Adam into two, one part directed toward sensual and bodi-
ly pleasures, the other responsive to the guidance of intellect. The trouble 
is that intellect has also been corrupted, so it now habitually produces evil 
thoughts as well as good.48 This calls for a response that can be summarized 
44Plato, Republic VI 511d; Phaedrus 247c.
45Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II.19 100b5–17; Nicomachean Ethics VI.6 1141a3–8, IX.8 
1168b28–1169a18, X.7 1177b26–1178a7; Metaphysics XII.7 1072b14–30.
46See, for example, Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 4.1; Origen, Against Celsus VI.69, On 
First Principles II.8.3, II.11.7 (assuming that mens here translates nous); Athanasius, Against the 
Heathen 2.3–4, 30.3; Gregory Nazianzen, Orations 28.17, Epistle 51, with further references in G. 
W. H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), s.v. nous I.C.1a, 5a–c.
47A fuller history would have to include several other authors also represented in volume 1 
of the Philokalia, especially Mark the Monk (early fifth century), who may have been a source 
for Diadochus’s teaching on baptism; see Kallistos Ware, “The Sacrament of Baptism and the 
Ascetic Life in the Teaching of Mark the Monk,” Studia Patristica 10 (1972), pp. 441–452.
48See Diadochus of Photike, On Spiritual Knowledge pp. 24–25, 29, 88, translated in Philoka-
lia, vol. 1. For the Greek text see Diadoque de Photicé, Oeuvres Spirituelles (Paris: Éditions du 
Cerf, 1955).
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under three headings. In the first place, the perceptive faculty must be uni-
fied by learning “persistently to be detached from the good things of this 
world,” so that it becomes wholly responsive to intellect.49 This requires 
disciplining the senses through fasting and other forms of self-denial; 
struggling to endure suffering patiently and with joy; learning not to judge 
others or return evil for evil; and, if possible, selling one’s goods to give to 
the poor.50 Yet such labors will be of no value if the intellect remains divid-
ed. Hence, in the second place, there is also need for divine grace, for only 
the Holy Spirit can purify the intellect of its evil inclinations.51 The grace 
that is needed is in a sense already given at baptism; however, it remains 
“hidden in the depths of the intellect, concealing its presence even from the 
perception of the intellect itself.”52 It hides in this way because God wishes 
to honor our free will and so He is “waiting to see which way the soul 
inclines.”53 Only when there is human effort does the hidden grace become 
active, so that “in a mysterious way, by means of intellectual perception, 
grace communicates something of its riches to his soul.”54
That brings us to the third aspect of Diadochus’s teaching. Although 
grace is given at baptism and becomes fully active through the love of 
God, God does not impel us without our free cooperation. Thus one must 
continuously and ardently seek grace, and do everything in one’s power 
to cooperate with its working. For Diadochus this means especially guard-
ing the intellect through the constant invocation of “the glorious and holy 
name of the Lord Jesus.”55 The intellect has a need for activity which leads 
it to “dissipate” itself abroad, whether through the beguilements of the 
senses, or excessive talking, or even—paradoxically enough—through 
listlessness and despair.56 According to Diadochus:
When we have blocked all its outlets by means of the remembrance of God, 
the intellect requires of us imperatively some task which will satisfy its need 
for activity. For the complete fulfillment of its purpose we should give it 
nothing but the prayer “Lord Jesus.” “No one,” it is written, “can say ‘Lord 
Jesus’ except in the Holy Spirit” (I Cor. 12:3). Let the intellect continually 
concentrate on these words within its inner shrine with such intensity that it 
is not turned aside to any mental images . . . . For when the mind (dianoia) is 
closely concentrated upon this name, then we grow fully conscious that the 
name is burning up all the filth which covers the surface of the soul; for it is 
written, “Our God is a consuming fire” (Deut. 4:24).57
49Ibid., p. 29; tr. Philokalia, vol. 1, p. 261.
50Ibid., p. 42–43, 54, 63–66.
51See Ibid., p. 28.
52Ibid., p. 77; tr. Philokalia, vol. 1, p. 279.
53Ibid., p. 85; tr. Philokalia, vol. 1, p. 285.
54Ibid., p. 77; tr. Philokalia, vol. 1, p. 279.
55Ibid., p. 31; tr. Philokalia, vol. 1, p. 261.
56See Ibid., pp. 55–58, 68, 70, 96.
57Ibid., p. 59; tr. Philokalia vol. 1, p. 270.
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One whose intellect is thus recollected and unified through the constant 
invocation of Jesus comes to “dwell continually within his own heart.”58 
The heart is, as it were, the home of the intellect, and the intellect is 
the deepest center of the heart. Diadochus illustrates their relationship 
through an analogy:
When a man stands out of doors in winter at the break of day, facing the 
east, the front of his body is warmed by the sun, while his back is still cold 
because the sun is not on it. Similarly, the heart of those who are beginning 
to experience the energy of the Spirit is only partially warmed by God’s 
grace. The result is that, while their intellect begins to produce spiritual 
thoughts, the outer parts of the heart continue to produce thoughts after 
the flesh, since the members of the heart have not yet all become fully con-
scious of the light of God’s grace shining upon them. . . . But when we begin 
wholeheartedly to carry out the commandments of God, all our organs of 
perception will become fully conscious of the light of grace; grace will con-
sume our thoughts with its flames, sweetening our hearts in the peace of 
uninterrupted love.59
Although Diadochus does not speak explicitly of “drawing the mind into 
the heart,” plainly the idea is already present. By thus returning the intel-
lect to its home within the heart, what I referred to earlier as the faculty of 
spiritual receptivity comes again to be centered in the organ of spiritual 
receptivity, where God especially imparts the gift of grace.
Macarius, Evagrius, and Diadochus together present most of the ele-
ments of what later came to be known as the “hesychast” tradition (from 
hēsychia, silence). These include the identification of the heart as the rul-
ing organ of the body; the belief that the intellect is naturally centered in 
the heart, but has been dissipated through the senses and the passions; 
the emphasis on overcoming this dissipation by guarding one’s thoughts 
and constantly invoking the Lord Jesus; and, not least, a recognition of 
the continuous subtle interplay of human effort and divine grace. Two 
other elements were later added which crystallized the tradition into its 
final and mature form. One was the expansion of the simple invocation, 
“Lord Jesus,” into the more expansive “Lord Jesus Christ, son of God, 
have mercy on me,” found from around the sixth century onward.60 This 
fuller form and its variants—sometimes without “son of God,” some-
times with the addition of the final words, “a sinner”—are known as the 
Jesus Prayer.
The other new element was the use of physical techniques in accompa-
niment with the Jesus Prayer to aid the intellect in returning to the heart. 
Although the Jesus Prayer was from an early date synchronized with the 
act of breathing, with the aim that the name of Jesus would accompany 
every breath, the association of such techniques with the movement of the 
58Ibid., p. 58; tr. Philokalia vol. 1, p. 270, slightly modified.
59Ibid., p. 88; tr. Philokalia vol. 1, p. 287.
60See Kallistos Ware, “The Jesus Prayer in St. Gregory of Sinai,” Eastern Churches Review 4 
(1972), pp. 3–22, at pp. 12–13.
THE MIND AND THE HEART IN THE CHRISTIAN EAST AND WEST 593
mind into the heart appears to have been made first only toward the end 
of the thirteenth century, among the monks of Mount Athos in Greece.61 
As an example we may quote this instruction from St. Gregory of Sinai:
Sitting from dawn on a seat about nine inches high, compel your intellect to 
descend from your head into your heart, and retain it there. Keeping your 
head forcibly bent downwards, and suffering acute pain in your chest, shoul-
ders, and neck, persevere in repeating noetically or in your soul “Lord Jesus 
Christ, have mercy.” . . . Restrain your breathing, so as not to breathe unim-
pededly; for when you exhale, the air, rising from the heart, beclouds the 
air and ruffles your thinking, keeping the intellect away from the heart. . . .  
But restraining your breathing as much as possible, and enclosing your in-
tellect in your heart, invoke the Lord Jesus continuously and diligently, and 
you will swiftly consume and subdue them [i.e., evil thoughts and other 
distractions], flaying them invisibly with the divine name.62
The purpose of coordinating prayer, posture, and breathing in this way is 
not only that the intellect come to dwell in the heart; it is also that the prayer 
become “self-acting,” so much a part of one’s being that it continues even 
in the midst of other activities. Perhaps the most vivid description of such 
a state is that in The Way of a Pilgrim, the memoir of an anonymous Russian 
peasant who devoted his life to the practice of the Jesus Prayer. The author 
writes, “I had the feeling that the prayer had, so to speak, by its own action 
passed from my lips to my heart. That is to say, it seemed as though my 
heart in its ordinary beating began to say the words of the prayer within at 
each beat. Thus for example, one, ‘Lord,’ two, ‘Jesus,’ three, ‘Christ,’ and so 
on. I gave up saying the prayer with my lips. I simply listened carefully to 
what my heart was saying. . . . Further there came into my heart a gracious 
warmth which spread through my whole breast.”63
Since The Way of a Pilgrim is anonymous one cannot be sure to what 
extent it may be fictionalized or embellished (although it has been widely 
accepted as truthful). Let me complement it by a more recent account by a 
person of some prominence, the Elder Cleopa Elie (1912–1998) of Sihastria 
Monastery in Romania. This remarkable man was for many years a shep-
herd and simple monk before his unexpected elevation as abbot. He soon 
was recognized by the Communist government as a highly effective, and 
therefore dangerous, spiritual leader. After many years of persecution, ul-
timately, with the fall of the Ceausescu government, he came to be widely 
regarded throughout Romania as a modern-day starets.64 The following is 
from an account of his imprisonment in 1948:
61See Kallistos Ware, “Praying with the Body: The Hesychast Method and Non-Christian 
Parallels,” Sobornost 14 (1992), pp. 6–35, especially pp. 9–10.
62Gregory of Sinai, “On Stillness: Fifteen Texts,” 2, tr. Philokalia, vol. 4, p. 264; cf. the discus-
sions of this passage in Ware, “Jesus Prayer,” pp. 14–15, and “Praying with the Body,” p. 16.
63The Way of a Pilgrim and The Pilgrim Continues His Way, trans. R. M. French (New York: 
Harper), pp. 19–20.
64See Archimandrite Ioanichie Balan, Elder Cleopa of Sihastria (Lake George, Colorado: 
New Varatec Publishing, 2001).
594 Faith and Philosophy
For five days he sat in a cement basement and was continuously questioned, 
while the Securitate shined bright electrical lights into his eyes. There was no 
bed and he was not allowed food or water. Fr. Cleopa would later recall this 
method of interrogation: “Later, I asked Fr. Marcu [who also was imprisoned] 
why they put so many lights in my eyes. I’d put my hands over my eyes so the 
light would no longer beat down. . . . It seemed as if it entered my brain! My 
brain hurt! They wanted me to lose my memory so that I’d no longer speak.” 
He would also later reveal to his close disciples how he was able to endure 
this torture: “Whoever would enter there would depart nearly crazy. They 
also put me there so that I would lose my mind. I could no longer see with my 
eyes and could not bear the heat. Then I descended with my mind into my 
heart with the Prayer of Jesus. After an hour they took me out and were all 
amazed that I could still speak and move without anyone holding me.”65
Extraordinary although this story may be, it is in a sense emblematic of the 
role that hesychast spirituality has played within the Orthodox church. 
The great flowering of hesychasm on Mount Athos occurred just as Byz-
antium was entering its final military and political decline. If one asks 
how Orthodoxy was able to survive, first in Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria 
under the Turks, and later in Russia and the Slavic lands under successive 
waves of the Mongol conquest, westernization, and Communism, a large 
part of the answer must be the role played by hesychasm in keeping alive 
a simple and direct form of personal sanctity.66
Nonetheless, the intense concentration involved in such techniques, 
and exceptional claims made on their behalf, have raised in some the sus-
picion that they are no more than a form of self-hypnosis.67 Although a 
full examination of this question is beyond our scope here, it is surely rel-
evant to note that such techniques are normally not practiced in isolation, 
but are part of a comprehensive way of life. Every teacher of hesychast 
prayer emphasizes that physical techniques are of value only when they 
are accompanied by fasting, vigils, frequent confession, strict obedience 
to a monastic elder or other experienced guide, and careful watchfulness 
over one’s thoughts, as well as an attitude of deep contrition and devotion 
to Christ.68 Such teachers also emphasize that for the prayer to become 
self-acting is not an automatic consequence, but a gift given only when 
God wills. Often, as for the Russian pilgrim, it is not so much the summit 
of spiritual progress as a stage along the way, one that may be followed 
by many further struggles.
65Archimandrite Ioanichie Balan, “Shepherd of Souls: Elder Cleopa the New Hesychast of 
Romania,” Orthodox Word 36.2 (March 2000), pp. 60–79, at p. 69.
66For a survey of this history see John Meyendorff, St. Gregory Palamas and Orthodox Spiri-
tuality (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1974), pp. 127–72.
67For this charge see Dom Cuthbert Butler, Western Mysticism (New York: Harper, 1966), 
p. 127. 
68For contemporary examples see Monastic Wisdom: The Letters of Elder Joseph the Hesychast 
(Florence, Arizona: St. Anthony’s Greek Orthodox Monastery, 1998); Counsels from the Holy 
Mountain Selected from the Letters and Homilies of Elder Ephraim (Florence, Arizona: St. An-
thony’s Greek Orthodox Monastery, 1999).
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All of these are points that would have to be carefully developed in any 
full discussion of hesychasm. I merely touch on them here because our in-
terest is less in the hesychast tradition itself than in what such practices re-
veal about the eastern Christian view of the mind and the heart. If nothing 
else, quotations such as those just offered make it plain that in speaking of 
the heart as “the first rational organ of the body,” the hesychasts really do 
mean the heart as a bodily organ. However, they find in this organ levels 
of spiritual potential that are quite foreign to the heart as it is understood 
in the West. Likewise, they find in the mind a capacity for return to the 
heart that, from a western standpoint, seems equally foreign.
IV
What are we to make of these two quite different ways of viewing the mind 
and the heart? It is probably best to begin by recognizing that, in light of 
the enormously varied histories and associations of both terms, any global 
understanding of what they mean must necessarily be an interpretation. 
By this I mean not only that it is a particular way of construing the facts, 
but that it involves a choice regarding which facts to regard as relevant. 
In the present case, the modern western view is that, if one is interested 
in the literal meaning of the mind and the heart, then the relevant facts are 
those accessible to scientific observation as well as, in the case of the mind, 
introspection. This view certainly recognizes that there are other aspects to 
the heart’s cultural meaning, but it sees them as irrelevant to the heart as a 
bodily organ. The East, by contrast, takes the relevant range of facts to con-
sist in the phenomenological reality of our emotional, cognitive, and spiri-
tual lives, particularly as they are described within Biblical and patristic 
sources. Science has a role to play, but it is the subordinate one of identify-
ing the material structures that underlie our lived experience.69 One advan-
tage of approaching both views historically, as we have done here, is that it 
highlights the extent to which both are the products of complex and largely 
contingent factors. The West’s sharp distinction between the literal and the 
metaphorical heart is hardly self-evident, but came about only because of 
the way a certain type of Biblical exegesis and literary and spiritual devel-
opment dovetailed with early modern science. Likewise the East’s particu-
lar understanding of the mind and the heart does not simply fall out from 
the Bible, nor even from the Bible plus the early Church Fathers, but has 
been formed by many centuries of spiritual and ascetic struggle.
Despite their differences, both views are attempts to recognize what truly 
exists—to “divide reality at the joints,” in Plato’s phrase—and they overlap 
sufficiently so that fruitful dialogue between them ought to be possible. In 
this final section I would like to consider two objections that might be raised 
against the eastern view. One is that the hesychasts wrongly conceive of 
the mind as a quasi-material entity, one that cannot exist without material 
69So, for example, no hesychast today would speak of air “rising from the heart” in quite 
the same way as does Gregory of Sinai, inasmuch as it seems to be predicated on Galenic phys-
iology, but this is a minor point that in no way affects the essentials of hesychast teaching.
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localization, whether it be in the head or the heart.70 Another—and probably 
the one that most readily occurs from a modern western standpoint—is that 
their view is based on an outmoded physiology, including an ignorance of 
the crucial role played by the brain and the nervous system in serving as a 
basis for thought.71 Addressing these concerns will take us some distance to-
ward seeing to what extent, if at all, the eastern view remains viable today.
In an important passage, Gregory Palamas explains that properly speak-
ing the mind is incorporeal, so that it is present in the heart, “not confined 
. . . as in a container,” but instead “as in an instrument.”72 He almost certain-
ly means to allude here to the long discussion of this point in St. Gregory of 
Nyssa’s On the Making of Man.73 Chapter 12 of that work considers in detail 
the opposing views which placed the rational part of the soul in the head 
and the heart. It sees some merit in both, since the former has in its sup-
port the fact that thinking is impeded when the brain is damaged, and the 
latter the fact that the passions are felt especially in the heart. Yet, Gregory 
argues, neither view is correct, for since the mind is incorporeal it is equally 
in contact with all the parts of the body. The sensation of passion in the 
heart can be explained as due to various bodily mechanisms (for example, 
the heating of the blood accompanying anger), and the fact that damage to 
the brain impedes thinking can be explained as due to the brain’s dimin-
ished capacity to receive the influence of the mind. It is to illustrate the lat-
ter point that Gregory introduces the analogy with an instrument:
since the whole body is made like some musical instrument, just as often 
happens in the case of those who know how to play but are unable because 
of the unfitness of their instrument . . . so too the mind, passing over the 
whole instrument and touching each of the parts in a mode correspond-
ing to its intellectual activities . . . produces its proper effect on those parts 
which are in a natural condition, but remains inoperative and ineffective 
upon those which are unable to admit the movement of its art.74
Something similar also happens in sleep, when the mind is “hidden by the 
inactivity of the senses” and so is not able to operate through them fully, 
but instead has only a “smouldering activity.”75
70This is an objection raised by Guillaumont, “Les sens des noms du Coeur,” pp. 79–80.
71I wish to thank H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. and Mark Cherry for particularly pressing 
this objection.
72Gregory Palamas, Triads I.2.3; tr. Gendle, pp. 42–43. This section of the Triads (I.2) is also 
available in the Philokalia, vol. 4, pp. 331–342.
73See Triads II.2.27–29 and section 3 of the so-called Hagioritic Tome (tr. Philokalia, vol. 4, p. 421), 
where Palamas cites this text explicitly. The view that the soul uses the body as an instrument 
can also be found in On the Making of Man by Nemesius of Emesa, another patristic work (dating 
probably from a few decades after that of Gregory of Nyssa) that would have been known to 
Palamas; see the translation by William Tefler, Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa, Library of 
Christian Classics, vol. 4 (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1955), p. 274; Greek text in Nemesius 
of Emesa, De Natura Hominis, ed. Moreno Morani (Leipzig: Teubner, 1987), pp. 25–26.
74Gregory of Nyssa, On the Making of Man XII.8; tr. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982 [reprint]), Second Series, vol. 5, p. 398.
75Ibid., XIII.8; tr. NPNF, vol. 5, p. 401.
THE MIND AND THE HEART IN THE CHRISTIAN EAST AND WEST 597
The view of Palamas is not quite identical to this, for he does think that 
there is a clear sense in which the mind’s natural and proper home is the 
heart. Nonetheless, he agrees that the mind is incorporeal and is present 
in the body only as in an instrument.76 In what sense, then, is the heart its 
natural home, and what does it mean to speak of the mind as “gathered 
together” and “led back” into the heart? The answer is that in such a pro-
cess the mind learns to use its bodily instrument differently, focusing its 
activities within the heart rather than dissipating them abroad through the 
senses, and that in so doing the two achieve—or rather, return to—their 
natural relationship. As an analogy we might consider the different ways in 
which a beginner and an expert horseman are related to the horse on which 
they ride. The actions of the beginner are dispersed, erratic, and ineffectual, 
leaving the horse more in control than the rider; those of the expert are 
measured and precise, conveying exactly the direction needed in light of 
the rider’s knowledge both of his own goal and of the horse’s innate abili-
ties and tendencies. In a sense the beginner and the expert are both equally 
present to the horse, but in another sense the expert is far more present, 
for he is effectually present in a way that the beginner is not. Likewise the 
experienced rider sits more “naturally” upon the horse, the two having 
achieved through long practice a unity of feeling and response, whereas 
the beginner seems by contrast like so much dead weight. In a similar way, 
the mind can come to be effectually present to the heart, enabling the two 
to act as a unity in their natural and proper relationship, even while in an-
other sense it remains equally present throughout the entire body.
This clarification enables us to see how the two objections can be an-
swered. Since Palamas (the most authoritative spokesman for the hesychasts) 
explicitly affirms that the mind is immaterial, the charge that the hesychasts 
conceive of the mind as quasi-material is simply misinformed. As for the 
claim that their view cannot withstand modern discoveries about the neu-
ral basis of the mind, everything depends on what is meant by “basis.” If it 
could be shown that neural activity produces thought, then Palamas’s view, 
along with most other forms of mind-body dualism, would be discredited. 
But it is hard to see how this could be shown, since empirical evidence fur-
nishes only correlations between mental and neural events, and the inter-
pretation of these correlations always remains a further question. Palamas’s 
view is that the mind uses the brain and nervous system as instruments; 
that there would be correlations between brain states and mental states is 
therefore hardly surprising. He also believes that the mind uses the heart 
(and, for that matter, other organs) as instruments, but in a different way. 
The heart is the deepest center of personality and the place most intimately 
76In another work written toward the end of the hesychast controversy, Palamas reaf-
firms dualism even more strongly: “The soul . . . possesses a spiritual and noetic life that is 
evidently different from the body’s and from what is actuated by the body. Hence when the 
body dissolves the human soul does not perish with it; and not only does it not perish but 
it continues to exist immortally, since it is not manifest only in relation to something else, 
but possesses its own life as its essence.” “Topics of Natural and Theological Science” 32; tr. 
Philokalia, vol. 4, p. 359.
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touched by divine grace, yet the mind’s presence to it is tenuous and clum-
sy. The hesychasts’ goal is to overcome this inner dislocation. There is no 
reason why such a change need affect the mind’s way of using other organs 
such as the brain, any more than someone’s learning to ride a horse must 
affect his way of using other tools such as a lasso or a gun.
We thus come to the perhaps surprising conclusion that the psycho-
somatic holism of the eastern view depends upon mind-body dualism. 
It remains legitimately a form of holism, however, in at least two key re-
spects. One is that it takes seriously the phenomenology of the heart as 
it is articulated within the Bible and patristic tradition. It thus retains the 
holistic outlook of the Bible itself, although within a framework in which 
key elements are also drawn from Greek philosophy. The second is that it 
sees the return of the mind into the heart as a way in which grace comes 
to be present, not to the mind alone, but to the entire body. This idea is 
present already in Macarius and the other Desert Fathers, and is fully ar-
ticulated by Palamas:
Just as those who abandon themselves to sensual and corruptible pleasures 
fix all the desires of their soul upon the flesh, and indeed become entirely 
“flesh,” so that (as Scripture says) “the Spirit of God cannot dwell in them,” 
so too in the case of those who have elevated their minds to God and exalted 
their souls with divine longing, their flesh also is being transformed and 
elevated, participating together with the soul in the divine communion, and 
becoming itself a dwelling and possession of God.77
The deification of the flesh is a central theme in Greek patristic theology, 
one that we cannot enter into fully here.78 Suffice to say that it adds to the 
phenomenological holism of the East a further ethical or teleological ho-
lism, in that the goal of earthly life is to begin here and now the process by 
which the whole person, body and soul, comes to be deified.
In sum, the eastern tradition presents a holistic practical stance toward 
our bodily condition that is made possible, in part, by an ontological dual-
ism. Such a combination is surprising from the standpoint of traditional 
western philosophy. Nonetheless it seems both coherent and plausible, at 
least given Christian presuppositions; and it offers real hope that the mind 
and the heart need not always stand apart, but can in fact be reunified.79
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77Gregory Palamas, Triads I.2.9; tr. Gendle, pp. 47–48.
78See Norman Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), or more briefly my Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics 
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